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INTRODUCTION
What if instead of seeing criminal court as an institution driven by the
operation of rules, we saw it as a workplace where people labor to criminalize
those with the misfortune to be prosecuted? Early observers of twentieth
century urban criminal courts likened them to factories.1 Since then,
commentators often deploy the pejorative epithet “assembly line justice” to
describe criminal court’s processes.2 The term conveys the criticism of a
* Assistant Professor, University of Georgia School of Law. This Essay was prepared for the
Colloquium entitled Subversive Lawyering, hosted by the Fordham Law Review and
co-organized by the Center on Race, Law, and Justice and the Stein Center for Law and Ethics
on October 15–16, 2021, at Fordham University School of Law. The ideas in this piece
emerged out of conversations with Rachel Foran, Puck Lo, Pilar Weiss, Andrea Ritchie, and
Mariame Kaba. In 2020, Rachel Foran, Puck Lo, and I catalogued examples of direct action
that could further abolitionist struggles, including the United Teachers of Los Angeles’s strike
that I discuss here. See Community Justice Exchange, DIRECT ACTION FOR PRISON ABOLITION,
https://directactionzine.communityjusticeexchange.org [https://perma.cc/KA9Z-D4TD] (last
visited Mar. 4, 2022). I am grateful to John Pfaff for sharing his time explaining his empirical
analysis. Thank you to the Fordham Law Review; the Center on Race, Law, and Justice; and
the Stein Center for Law and Ethics for organizing the Colloquium and to Julia Hatheway,
Luis del Rosario, and Mary Hornak for their excellent editorial assistance.
1. See ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME 81–82 (2018) (cataloging
the various nicknames given to criminal courts, particularly misdemeanor courts, including
assembly line processing, “McJustice,” or a supermarket, the term used by Malcolm Feeley).
2. Matthew Clair points out that the term “assembly line justice” comes from Abraham
Blumberg’s 1967 book entitled Criminal Justice, in which he described how the courts
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mechanical system delivering a form of justice that is impersonal and fallible.
Perhaps unintentionally, the epithet reveals another truth: criminal court is
also a workplace, and it takes labor to keep it running. But beyond a
metaphor, how might a sustained analysis of labor in criminal courts enhance
our power of observation?
The social theorist who pioneered labor as a prism of analysis was Karl
Marx.3 For Marx, human labor was the source of all value and the engine for
world historical change.4 Marx’s labor theory of value formed the building
block to his philosophy of history: dialectical historical materialism.5 It was
not abstract ideas that drove historical progress but rather the creative energy
that humans poured into their efforts.6 But a person does not approach the
world as an artist before a blank canvas.7 Rather, people live in a particular
time in history and face specific limits that mediate their creative energies.8
It is from that dialectical alchemy of engaged human effort and historically
contingent material conditions that an existing or an entirely new social
structure can emerge.9 Inherently, Marx’s theory of history held open the
possibility for social transformation because of the weight he afforded to
human agency. Because Marx wrote about a system—capitalism—in a way
administered “assembly line justice.” See MATTHEW CLAIR, PRIVILEGE AND PUNISHMENT:
HOW RACE AND CLASS MATTER IN CRIMINAL COURT 13 (2020). The U.S. Supreme Court used
this term in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36 (1972).
3. Marx adapted his theory of labor from David Ricardo and developed it in Capital,
Volume I. See generally 1 KARL MARX, CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
(Samuel Moore & Edward Aveling trans., Frederick Engels ed., 2018) (1887).
4. See generally Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, in 1 MARX/ENGELS SELECTED WORKS
28 (1986).
5. See KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE HOLY FAMILY, OR CRITIQUE OF CRITICAL
CRITICISM 116 (Richard Dixon & Clement Dutts trans., 1975) (“History does nothing, it
‘possesses no immense wealth’, it ‘wages no battles’. It is man, real, living man who does all
that, who possesses and fights; ‘history’ is not, as it were, a person apart, using man as a means
to achieve its own aims; history is nothing but the activity of man pursuing his aims.”); Letter
from Friedrich Engels to J. Bloch (Sept. 21, 1890), https://www.marxists.org/archive/
marx/works/1890/letters/90_09_21.htm [https://perma.cc/NW47-MGHM] (“According to the
materialist conception of history, the ultimately determining element in history is the
production and reproduction of real life.”).
6. See KARL MARX & FREDERICK ENGELS, THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY 47 (C.J. Arthur ed.,
1970) (“Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms
of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of independence. They have no history,
no development; but men, developing their material production and their material intercourse,
alter, along with this their real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking. Life
is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life.”).
7. See KARL MARX, THE EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE OF LOUIS BONAPARTE 6 (Saul K.
Padover trans., 2d ed. 1852) (“Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they
please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances
existing already, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all dead generations
weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living.”).
8. See Marx, supra note 4, at 29. Marx rejected a view of human effort that was uniquely
individual: “[T]he human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its
reality it is the ensemble of the social relations.” Id. As Graeber puts it, “one that sees society
as arising from creative action, but creative action as something that can never be separated
from its concrete, material medium.” DAVID GRAEBER, TOWARDS AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL
THEORY OF VALUE: THE FALSE COIN OF OUR OWN DREAMS 54 (2001).
9. See MARX & ENGELS, supra note 6, at 47.
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that he hoped could be useful to those working to overthrow it, it seems
particularly apt to invoke his work in a colloquium dedicated to thinking
about subverting legal systems.10
Although Marx developed his labor theory of value to elucidate the real
dynamics animating commercial exchange, anthropologists like David
Graeber have adapted his insights to other spheres of life.11 Institutions,
including legal ones, Graeber argues, are only as powerful and valuable as
the human effort behind them.12 Just as Marx scrutinized the dynamics of
commodity exchange to discover the true source of economic value, Graeber
encouraged scholars to study institutions and cultural practices as practical
philosophies where people enact their “conceptions of what is ultimately
good, proper, or desirable in human life.”13
With Graeber and Marx in mind, I offer three different ways to think about
labor in criminal court: (1) labor as a source of sociological value, (2) labor
as an input that generates certain measurable outcomes, and (3) labor as a
vehicle to advance abolitionist reforms.
First, through their quotidian activities, criminal courts’ workers enact a
practical philosophy that communicates lessons about who and how we value
each other. Drawing on ethnographic accounts, I argue that criminal courts’
actors—prosecutors and judges, among others—engage in “violence
work.”14 The violence is not only physical but also social and structural.
Their labor weakens social bonds and entrenches group-level hierarchies,
expressed as race, class, and ability.
Second, labor is an input that determines the size of the criminal
punishment system. The addition of more prosecutors and their increased
productivity lies at the heart of the historic growth in prison admissions at
the turn of the twentieth century.15 In turn, as advocates devise reforms to
dismantle mass criminalization, shrinking prosecutors’ offices may be the
key to true transformation.
Third, labor is also a vital site for struggle. The labor lens illuminates the
promise of a specific strategy: building social movement labor unionism in
public defenders’ offices. Unionized public defenders are uniquely
10. See Marx, supra note 4, at 30 (“The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in
various ways; the point, however, is to change it.”).
11. See GRAEBER, supra note 8, at 60–63.
12. Marx explains:
The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism—that of Feuerbach included—
is that the thing . . . , reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the
object . . . or of contemplation . . . , but not as human sensuous activity, practice, not
subjectively. Hence it happened that the active side, in contradistinction to
materialism, was developed by idealism—but only abstractly, since, of course,
idealism does not know real, sensuous activity as such.
Marx, supra note 4, at 28; see GRAEBER, supra note 8, at 60 (discussing the wisdom of
structuralism developed by French psychologist Jean Piaget, “which starts from action, and
views ‘structure’ as the coordination of activity”).
13. GRAEBER, supra note 8, at 1.
14. MICOL SEIGEL, VIOLENCE WORK: STATE POWER AND THE LIMITS OF POLICE 11 (2018).
15. JOHN PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION AND HOW TO
ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 129 (2016).
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positioned to leverage their working conditions as a platform to advocate for
abolitionist reforms that benefit society more broadly: they can demand
reductions to prosecutors’ offices to reduce their caseloads and shrink the
size of the criminal punishment system. Such a tactic subverts not only the
continued operation of criminal courts but also traditional expectations of
lawyers as experts leveraging their rarified skills. Instead, the lawyers
position themselves as workers and members of the organized labor
movement.
I. LABOR AS A SOURCE OF VALUE
In this part, I pay attention to criminal law’s practitioners, the way they
carry out their work, and the value they generate through their labor.
Examining criminal court as a workplace offers a grounded material view of
the institution. As Robert Cover explains, “the normative world building
which constitutes ‘Law’ is never just a mental or spiritual act. A legal world
is built only to the extent that there are commitments that place bodies on the
line.”16 David Graeber strikes a similar note in his rough approximation of
Marx’s theory of value in noneconomic spheres: “[T]he value [of] . . .
institution . . . is the proportion of a society’s creative energy it sinks into
producing and maintaining it.”17 Graeber makes the obvious but perhaps
clarifying point: the law is people and their “human-sensuous activity,” as
Marx would put it.18 The criminal process does not mechanically enact itself.
Rather, coordinated human activity enlivens it. The form and the fruits of
this concentrated human effort merit close scrutiny.
As criminal law’s primary actors, and as the protagonists of criminal court,
prosecutors and judges embody the law’s characteristics. To build criminal
law’s moral universe, they deploy violent means and pursue violent ends
acting on the bodies and lives of individuals accused of crimes.19 Prosecutors
and judges, along with court officers, police officers, and corrections officers
perform “violence work,” to borrow Professor Micol Seigel’s term.20 They
calibrate, rationalize, and allocate state coercion.21 Judges and prosecutors
dispense physical violence most obviously at sentencing when they impose
a stint in jail or prison.22 But sociologists of criminal court have long
illuminated the punitive valence of criminal proceedings even before any trial
has occurred, a conviction is obtained, and a person is sentenced. Indeed,
16. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1605 (1986).
17. GRAEBER, supra note 8, at 55.
18. Marx, supra note 4, at 29.
19. Whether we adapt a retributivist or utilitarian view of punishment, both converge in
their assessment that punishment is painful. See Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in JOSHUA
DRESSLER, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1282, 1283 (Joshua Dressler ed., 2d ed.
2002) (“Since punishment involves pain or deprivation that people wish to avoid, its
intentional imposition by the state requires justification.”).
20. SEIGEL, supra note 14, at 11.
21. See id.
22. DANIELLE SERED, UNTIL WE RECKON: VIOLENCE, MASS INCARCERATION, AND A ROAD
TO REPAIR 27–37 (2019) (discussing the violence inside prisons and jails and demonstrating
that confinement is not rehabilitative).

2022]

BARGAINING FOR ABOLITION

1957

more than forty years ago, Professor Malcolm Feeley declared this process
to be punishment.23
To extend the assembly line metaphor, if police place the person arrested
on a conveyor belt, then prosecutors crank the pulley, keeping the process in
motion to eventually ensure that a judge imposes some kind of penal
discipline down the line.24 Legal adjudication moves the conveyor belt
forward—that is, in order for the defendant to progress from one stage to the
next, a judge needs to issue a legal ruling. The process only moves forward
by compelling the accused’s appearance, either by the threat of or by actual
physical coercion in the form of pretrial detention.
Prosecutors perform the lion’s share of the adjudicative labor, making
them the system’s most powerful actors.25 Their charging decisions
orchestrate the path of the case. Prosecutors determine whether a case will
go to trial or be resolved with a plea.26 One labor-saving maneuver that
prosecutors consistently deploy is to charge the defendant with the highest
possible offense to secure a plea and avoid a labor-intensive trial.27 But they
do not work simply to extract convictions. Professor Issa Kohler-Hausmann
shows that assistant district attorneys in New York City use their charging
power to bring the urban underclass under court supervision.28 The district
attorneys’ offices in New York City tend to assign quality-of-life cases to
their new recruits, where they learn their craft by practicing on the lives of
Black and Latinx New Yorkers.29 The cases are often indistinguishable from
one another; their pleadings mirror the boilerplate language in the police
paperwork, which is itself reflective of the stubborn persistence of police
quotas.30 Kohler-Hausmann shows that district attorneys’ offices pursue
cases despite the fact that few will result in convictions.31 Some cases will
even be dismissed by design or by neglect.32 But the cost of processing the
23. See generally MALCOLM FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES
IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT (1979) (outlining the range of costs that individuals prosecuted
in misdemeanor court in New Haven, Connecticut, incur when they contest their charges,
including the costs of retaining counsel, lost wages, stress, and time).
24. See generally ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN
PROSECUTOR (2009).
25. See generally EMILY BAZELON, CHARGED: THE NEW MOVEMENT TO TRANSFORM
AMERICAN PROSECUTION AND END MASS INCARCERATION (2019); Marc L. Miller, Domination
& Dissatisfaction: Prosecutors as Sentencers, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1211 (2004); David A.
Sklansky, The Problems with Prosecutors, 1 ANN. REV. CRIMINOLOGY 451 (2018).
26. PFAFF, supra note 15, at 130–32.
27. Id. at 133.
28. Kohler-Hausmann shows how even the most lenient disposition in criminal court—a
deferred dismissal—still provides judges, police, and prosecutors with a tool to manage a huge
pool of New Yorkers. See ISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN, MISDEMEANORLAND: CRIMINAL COURTS
AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN AN AGE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 72–74 (2018).
29. See generally Zohra Ahmed, The Sanctuary of Prosecutorial Nullification, 83 ALB. L.
REV. 239 (2019).
30. See KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 28, at 40–42; NICOLE GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE,
CROOK COUNTY: RACISM AND INJUSTICE IN AMERICA’S LARGEST CRIMINAL COURT 69 (2016);
Ahmed, supra note 29, at 271–72.
31. See KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 28, at 68–69.
32. See id. at 150.
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case is displaced onto defendants who each have to return to court multiple
times. For defendants, it means repeated court dates, lost wages, and lost
time that court actors systematically devalue.33
For each court date, to enter these courtroom’s physical spaces,
nonlawyers must endure a set of humiliating rituals. Every morning, even
before the session begins, a long line of people with court dates hugs the
corner of the building—in rain, snow, or shine.34 The patient attendees wait,
only to be greeted by court officers guarding the cold metal detectors. After
they take off their outer garments and empty their pockets, those with court
dates can expect a brisk pat down. Then, the interminable wait begins, before
the court officer finally announces their cases. And, as prosecutors progress
through their thick piles of case files, defendants endure repeated trips to
court until their case is finally closed. Meanwhile, as the case is pending, the
defendant’s life hangs in the balance: even the seemingly benign mark of an
open criminal case is apparent to employers, landlords, creditors, and school
admissions officers who are given cause to deny a hopeful application.35
When it finally comes down to resolving the case, prosecutors determine the
ultimate disposition for quality-of-life offenses, based not on the strength of
the case but rather on the accused’s misfortune of being previously arrested
for something else.36
Although prosecutors are the most powerful violence workers in criminal
court, they tend to minimize the amount of power they exercise over people’s
lives, “placing that responsibility onto other systems out of or beyond their
control.”37 The defense attorney has an ambiguous relationship to this
violence work. At their most powerful, defense attorneys can slow down the
conveyor belt and create off-ramps to mitigate the work of their adversaries.
However, defense attorneys cannot expect to disrupt the entire operation
through their legal practice. At worst, the defense attorney legitimizes
carceral control by providing the illusion of due process.38
33. See VAN CLEVE, supra note 30, at 29.
34. See William Glaberson, Faltering Courts, Mired in Delays, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13,
2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/14/nyregion/justice-denied-bronx-court-systemmired-in-delays.html [https://perma.cc/73ES-G8B7] (“The problems [in Bronx Criminal
Court] are visible even before entering the courthouse on 161st Street, where the line to get
inside often stretches down the block and around the corner.”).
35. See KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 28, at 66, 144–45, 267.
36. See id. at 72.
37. Alexandra L. Cox & Camila Grip, The Legitimation Strategies of “Progressive”
Prosecutors, SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 1, 14, 17 (2021) (“The prosecutors’ strategies of
legitimation through displacement of responsibility and blame revealed the power that they
have to shape the meaning of ‘fairness’ in the context of their cases. For them, a fair or neutral
approach to cases is one that was not only ‘race blind’ but also neutral with respect to the facts
of a case.”).
38. See FEELEY, supra note 23, at 290 (arguing that constitutional rights for defendants in
criminal proceedings “may function largely as hollow symbols of fairness or at best as luxuries
or reserves to be called upon only in big, intense, or particularly difficult cases.”); Paul D.
Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 YALE L.J. 2176, 2201
(2013) (“[P]rocedural rights [such as the right to counsel] may be especially prone to
legitimate the status quo, because ‘fair’ process masks unjust substantive outcomes and makes
those outcomes seem more legitimate. In contrast, a right to a minimum wage, while it may
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Prosecutors, as they apply the criminal law, narrow the court’s attention to
the singular individual act. Their prerogative to blame obfuscates the
conditions outside of the individual’s control that makes criminalization
almost inevitable.39 Prosecutors blindfold themselves to the structural
conditions that shape who the police place on the assembly lines. But their
adherence to the myth of personal responsibility conflicts with the evidence.
Sociologists ascribe urban interpersonal violence, like homicide, to
conditions of extreme segregation.40 But criminal law focuses primarily on
the person who pulls the trigger. Even when prosecutors consider mitigation,
they still operate within the bounds of retributive justice, applying the
defendant’s social history as a discount against the accused’s
blameworthiness.41 Their work minimizes state failure and emphasizes
personal responsibility. Indeed, prosecutors are the cult of personal
responsibility’s most faithful practitioners.
This methodological individualism entrenches group-level differences. In
Chicago’s Cook County, sociologist Nicole Gonzalez Van Cleve captures
the tenor of the conversation between courtroom insiders as they negotiate
case resolutions.42 Van Cleve shows how the discourse of crime and its
attendant discourse of personal responsibility serves as the civil way to
launder discussions of racial hierarchies in racially neutral ways.43
Defendants’ ascribed personal characteristics feature prominently.44 Van
Cleve traces the logical and linguistic slippages in courtroom actors’
negotiations: the defendant’s poverty becomes ascribed to their laziness.45
legitimate unequal distribution of wealth, substantively improves the condition of the least
well-off in material ways.”).
39. See Barbara H. Fried, Beyond Blame, BOSTON REV. (June 28, 2013),
https://bostonreview.net/forum/barbara-fried-beyond-blame-moral-responsibilityphilosophy-law [https://perma.cc/S9JH-QB2B].
40. See generally Douglas S. Massey, Getting Away with Murder: Segregation and
Violent Crime in Urban America, 143 U. PENN. L. REV. 1203 (1995).
41. See Craig Haney, Violence and the Capital Jury: Mechanisms of Moral
Disengagement and the Impulse to Condemn to Death, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1459 (1997)
(“The notion that a defendant’s crime stems entirely from his evil makeup and that he therefore
deserves to be judged and punished exclusively on the basis of his presumably free, morally
blameworthy choices is rooted in a longstanding cultural ethos that capital jurors (like most
citizens) have been conditioned to accept uncritically. Add to this the well-documented
tendency of most people to commit . . . the ‘fundamental attribution error’ . . . . As a result,
the typical juror’s preexisting framework for understanding behavior is highly compatible with
the basic terms of the typical prosecutorial narrative.”); VAN CLEVE, supra note 30, at 62.
42. See VAN CLEVE, supra note 30, at 5.
43. See id. at 53–62; Nicole Gonzalez Van Cleve & Lauren Mayes, Criminal Justice
Through “Colorblind” Lenses: A Call to Examine the Mutual Constitution of Race and
Criminal Justice, 40 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 406, 407 (2015) (“Operating together, they produce
and promote the illusion of racial neutrality in criminal justice research while exacerbating
racial disproportionality in practice.”). See generally Rebecca Richardson Dunlea, “No Idea
Whether He’s Black, White, or Purple”: Colorblindness and Cultural Scripting in
Prosecution, CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming 2022) (finding that prosecutors in Florida seek to
approach their cases without accounting for racial disparities).
44. Malcolm Feeley similarly documents that the accused’s personal characteristics
feature prominently in plea negotiations. See FEELEY, supra note 23, at 162.
45. See VAN CLEVE, supra note 30, at 65.
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A past trauma solicits fear rather than empathy.46 The lawyers broker deals
by trading on pseudosociological tropes: broken families, absent fathers, and
dependent mothers.47 White courtroom insiders awkwardly appropriate
African-American vernacular to speak about Black defendants.48 These
ways of speaking parallel the pervasive racial discrimination that taints every
aspect of the court system.49 In this way, criminal legal processes play a
critical role in constructing racial hierarchy. Prosecutors and judges reserve
their more punitive criminal court sanctions for Black defendants, all other
things being equal, particularly in drugs and weapons prosecutions and in the
juvenile justice system.50 The latter has the effect of “creating a cumulative
record of disadvantage over the life course.”51
Other state-produced vulnerabilities become liabilities in court. Criminal
courts are public institutions that almost exclusively regulate the poor and the
working class.52 This is not a coincidence: policy makers in the 1970s
anticipated prison constructions based on the number of men who were
unemployed.53 Yet, despite the overrepresentation of poor people in criminal
court, being poor systematically disadvantages defendants and undermines
their cases in court.54 Court fines and fees, incarceration, and lost wages
further immiserate defendants.55 Criminal courts’ processes and the

46. See id. at 111.
47. See id. at 91.
48. See id. at 60.
49. See Matthew Clair & Amanda Woog, Courts and the Abolition Movement, 110 CALIF.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 13 nn.72–73) (on file with authors) (discussing the
research on racial bias in criminal court).
50. See Allen J. Beck & Alfred Blumstein, Racial Disproportionality in U.S. State
Prisons: Accounting for the Effects of Racial and Ethnic Differences in Criminal Involvement,
Arrests, Sentencing, and Time Served, 34 J. QUANT. CRIMINOLOGY 853, 877–78 (2018);
KATHERINE J. ROSICH, AM. SOC. ASS’N, RACE, ETHNICITY, AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
10 (2007) (“There is consensus among researchers that the most widespread forms of racial
discrimination in the American justice system occur in the treatment of juvenile offenders.”).
51. ROSICH, supra note 50, at 1, 9.
52. See Press Release, Prison Pol’y Initiative, Arrest, Release, Repeat: How Police and
Jails Are Misused to Respond to Social Problems (Aug. 2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/
reports/repeatarrests.html [https://perma.cc/QKZ7-HKBD].
53. See RUTH WILSON GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG: PRISONS, SURPLUS, CRISIS, AND
OPPOSITION IN GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA 72 (2007) (“If NAIRU [Non-Accelerating-Inflation
Rate of Unemployment] explains the systemic existence of the relative surplus population in
the most abstract neoclassical macroeconomic terms, its sociological presence is bounded by
the fatal coupling of power and difference, which resolves relationally according to internally
dynamic but structurally static racial hierarchies.”); ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON
POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME: THE MAKING OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 175
(2016) (arguing that, although policymakers, law enforcement officials, and scholars working
for the Nixon administration justified increased prison construction by citing to high rates of
reported crime, the “incarceration rates had little relationship to actual crime rates” and that
“[i]nstead, incarceration rates correlated directly to the number of black residents and the
extent of socioeconomic inequality within a given state”).
54. See CLAIR, supra note 2, at 13.
55. See Clair & Woog, supra note 49, at 15–18 (cataloging criminal courts’ economic
predation).
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punishment that they dispense also frequently weaponize expressions of
neurodivergence, transforming neurocognitive differences into disabilities.56
Criminal courts’ violence is thus not just physical but also structural.57 To
borrow scholar Ruth Wilson Gilmore’s formulation, the criminal punishment
system’s practitioners “exploit and renew fatal power-difference
couplings.”58 Gilmore elaborates: “There is no difference without power,
and neither power nor difference has an essential moral value. Rather, the
application of violence—the cause of premature deaths—produces political
power in a vicious cycle.”59 Gilmore draws attention to the legal and
extralegal processes, such as racism, ableism, and classism that produce
group-level hierarchies.60
Criminal procedure participates in these
processes, exploiting and reconstructing differences that stratify individuals
with life-altering consequences.61 The criminal punishment system shortens
people’s lives and inflicts psychological and emotional pain.62
Criminal law’s physical and structural violence weakens social bonds. But
that disintegration is also a cause: it is precisely the lack of social solidarity
that makes this multidimensional violence possible. When prosecutors make
charging decisions, they stigmatize defendants as blameworthy and castigate
them as unruly, harmful, or dangerous. They inherently assign value to
persons and behaviors, identifying who deserves our collective wrath and
who merits our solidarity. Their adjudication instructs not only those directly
entangled in criminal courts but also the public at large.
Criminal law’s practitioners engage in physical, structural, and social
violence: they force people into cages or, at least, they threaten to; they
exacerbate and reconfigure group-level differences that put those who are
criminalized at a distance from the levers of social, economic, and political
power; and they undermine social solidarity by erecting fault lines between
guilty and innocent.63 Taking a step back and opening the aperture, criminal
courts’ workers communicate lessons about who and what society ought to
value. These moral lessons are not always explicit or consistent, and they
exist only in human action. In turn, to erect a different theory of value would
thus require criminal court actors to perform their work differently, or to stop
altogether.

56. See generally Zohra Ahmed, The Right to Counsel in a Neoliberal Age, UCLA L.
REV. (forthcoming 2022).
57. See Paul Farmer, On Suffering and Structural Violence: A View from Below, 125
DÆDALUS 261, 274 (1996).
58. Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Fatal Couplings of Power and Difference: Notes on Racism
and Geography, 54 PRO. GEOGRAPHER 15, 16 (2002).
59. Id.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See Sandhya Kajeepeta, Community Spread, INQUEST (Dec. 9, 2021),
https://inquest.org/community-spread/ [https://perma.cc/H27J-EJJY].
63. See Gilmore, supra note 58, at 16.
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II. LABOR AS MATERIAL INPUT
Quantitative analysis confirms the qualitative picture above: greater
investment in labor, specifically in violence workers, played a critical role in
the historic explosion of the U.S. criminal punishment system.64 Yet,
surprisingly few reform efforts recognize the relationship between the size,
scope, and power of the criminal punishment system and the number of
violence workers it employs.65 Although the scale and intensity of carceral
institutions provoked a consensus that something is terribly wrong about the
American criminal punishment system, the solutions implemented have
produced mixed results: while the number of people who are incarcerated
has decreased, the net of carceral supervision has also extended to new
domains.66 Popular reforms purporting to address the crisis of mass
incarceration often select a narrow set of metrics to diagnose the size, scope,
and power of the system.67 This misaccounting rests in a misrecognition of
labor power. Efforts in Seattle, Washington, however, stand out as an
exception; there, advocates have called for reductions in the number of
violence workers employed in the city’s misdemeanor courts.68

64. See John F. Pfaff, The Micro and Macro Causes of Prison Growth, 28 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 1239, 1241 (2013).
65. See CRITICAL RESISTANCE, REFORMIST REFORMS VS. ABOLITIONIST STEPS IN POLICING,
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/59ead8f9692ebee25b72f17f/t/5b65cd58758d46d34254
f22c/1533398363539/CR_NoCops_reform_vs_abolition_CRside.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
KS8Z-DFZA]; see also CRITICAL RESISTANCE, REFORMIST REFORMS VS. ABOLITIONIST STEPS
TO END IMPRISONMENT (2021), http://criticalresistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/
CR_abolitioniststeps_antiexpansion_2021_eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/2A6P-AGSC]. Critical
Resistance is a prison abolitionist advocacy group, founded in 1997, that pioneered arguments
explaining why reformers ought to aim for reforms that shrink the size, scope, and power of
police departments, rather than those that deliberately or inadvertently expand their power.
CRITICAL RESISTANCE, http://criticalresistance.org/ [https://perma.cc/EX36-CNYC] (last
visited Mar. 4, 2022).
66. For example, as an apparent solution to aggressive drug prosecutions, jurisdictions
around the country embraced drug courts; yet, these alternative mechanisms have widened the
net of surveillance by criminal courts. See Scott H. Decker, A Systematic Analysis of
Diversion: Net Widening and Beyond, 13 J. CRIM. JUST. 207, 207 (1985); Morris B. Hoffman,
The Rehabilitative Ideal and the Drug Court Reality, 14 FED. SENT’G REP. 172, 172 (2001–
2002). See generally Josh Bowers, Contraindicated Drug Courts, 55 UCLA L. REV. 783
(2008); Eric J. Miller, Embracing Addiction: Drug Courts and the False Promise of Judicial
Interventionism, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1479 (2004).
67. I borrow this materialist heuristic size, scope, and power analysis from a recent piece
written by Rachel Foran, Mariame Kaba, and Katy Naples-Mitchell on abolitionist approaches
to prosecutor organizing. See Rachel Foran et al., Abolitionist Principles for Prosecutor
Organizing: Origins and Next Steps, 16 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 496, 518 (2021).
68. 2022 SOLIDARITY BUDGET 2 (2021), https://docs.google.com/document/d/
1LK2XaZQPJsvOQbdAl8lulUa3FnbanrW5D4LwEym6zEI/edit#heading=h.77hx6w52engx
[https://perma.cc/Z3JY-GZBJ] (“Seattle’s historic overinvestment in policing and punishment
as a response to social problems began a long-overdue reversal in 2020. This year, we demand
that the divestment from SPD continue, and that Seattle commit to shrink other parts of the
policing pipeline by defunding the municipal court and the criminal division of the City
Attorney’s office.”); see infra Part II.C.
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A. Prosecutors’ Labor Power Fueled Mass Incarceration
At any given moment, the number of people accused of crimes and the
number of criminal cases pending in a courthouse depend, in part, on labor
power, particularly the labor power of police and prosecutors. How much
they work and how intensely they perform their labor controls the number of
arrests, filings, and the power of carceral institutions.
Professor John Pfaff has established that more prosecutors and more
productive prosecutors played a significant role in fueling prison admissions
during the historic incarceration boom at the turn of the twentieth century.
As reported crime rates rose sharply between the 1970s and the 1990s,
including a 100 percent increase in the reported rate of violent crime,
prosecutors’ offices hired approximately 3000 more prosecutors nationally
to reach a total of about 20,000 on staff—representing a 17 percent increase
in staffing levels.69 As crime fell between 1990 and 2007 by 35 percent,
another 10,000 prosecutors were hired, swelling their ranks to 30,000.70 As
the number of reported crimes decreased, arrests decreased too; but as Pfaff
shows, with more staff, prosecutors could invest more time and attention to
a smaller case load than before.71
The result: prosecutors filed more felony charges per arrest than they ever
had before.72 Prosecutors used their glut of resources to ratchet up charges.
Pfaff shows that it was precisely the increase in felony filings per arrest that
drove up prison admissions, making prosecutors the protagonists in the story
of mass incarceration. Their offices’ capacities to hire more prosecutors and,
in turn, those prosecutors’ decisions to file charges, and specifically to file
felony charges, best explains prison growth.73 Pfaff explains, “Even if
individual prosecutors were no more aggressive than prosecutors in the past,
the increase in staff size would lead to more cases even as crime declined.”74
His data suggests that reforms aiming to change the culture of aggressive
prosecutions within prosecutors’ offices are taking aim at the wrong target if
they do not simultaneously address funding and staffing levels.75 The most
69. See PFAFF, supra note 15, at 129.
70. Id.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See generally John F. Pfaff, The Causes of Growth in Prison Admissions and
Populations (Jan. 23, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1990508 [https://perma.cc/P5W7-ZJW4]. Pfaff runs through various
possible explanations for the United States’s prison growth, including longer sentences, more
arrests, and more crime, but through a process of elimination, Pfaff finds that prison
admissions closely track felony filings, an output that the prosecutor controls. See id. at 3
(“Prison admissions grew by approximately 35% between 1994 and 2008, even while the
crime rate and the total number of arrests fell. But during that same time, felony filings rose
by approximately 35% as well, but admissions per filing remained flat.”).
74. PFAFF, supra note 15, at 130.
75. For an example of culture change reforms, see ETHAN LOWENS ET AL., PROSECUTORIAL
CULTURE CHANGE:
A PRIMER (2020), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/
5c4fbee5697a9849dae88a23/t/5f5172984adc463c0254bb65/1599173273238/IIP+Prosecutor
ial+Culture+Change+FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/49UT-MADP]
(offering
“recommendations designed to encourage prosecutors to think critically about the history of
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significant increases in staff took place in urban settings where prison
populations have been declining since the beginning of the twenty-first
century.76
Pfaff’s conclusions demonstrate that labor is critical to understanding the
development of the American penal system. And although Pfaff himself
never recommends this,77 his empirical analysis suggests that reducing staff
levels and labor hours in prosecutors’ offices may be a fertile starting point
for reformers seeking to reduce prison admissions and the number of people
under carceral supervision. Yet, despite Pfaff’s findings and their intuitive
appeal, the size of the labor force participating in criminal court is rarely the
object of reformers’ scrutiny.
B. The Misaccounting of Size
In the past decade, across the country, a wide swath of the political
spectrum has converged to decry mass incarceration and, to a lesser extent,
mass criminalization. From the so-called bipartisan consensus on criminal
justice reform to the abolitionist left, these voices draw our attention to nearly
two million people in confinement and six million under some form of
carceral supervision.78 In turn, reformers have argued for shrinking the
system so that it harms fewer people, although their reasons and tactics
vary.79 There is a lack of clarity and agreement about the best metric to
their institutions and foster in-depth conversations about current policy and ways to bring
about sustainable change”).
76. See JACOB KANG-BROWN & RAM SUBRAMANIAN, VERA INST. FOR JUST., OUT OF SIGHT:
THE GROWTH OF JAILS IN RURAL AMERICA 12 (2017) (juxtaposing the continuing rise in jail
populations in rural counties against the decline in urban counties).
77. See PFAFF, supra note 15, at 185–210.
78. See LAURA M. MARUSCHAK & TODD D. MINTON, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT.,
CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2017–2018, at 1 fig.1 (2020).
79. See Taylor Pendergrass, We Can Cut Mass Incarceration by 50 Percent, ACLU
(July 12, 2019, 10:00 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/smart-justice/mass-incarceration/wecan-cut-mass-incarceration-50-percent [https://perma.cc/6PZZ-HYF8]; About, RIGHT ON
CRIME, https://rightoncrime.com/about [https://perma.cc/UEC3-PZZW] (last visited Mar. 4,
2022) (“We want a prison system that incapacitates dangerous offenders and career criminals
but which is not used in such a way that makes nonviolent, low-risk offenders a greater risk
to the public upon release than before they entered.”). But see Dana Goldstein, How to Cut
the Prison Population by 50 Percent, MARSHALL PROJECT (Mar. 4, 2015, 7:15 AM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/03/04/how-to-cut-the-prison-population-by-50percent [https://perma.cc/44P7-DJUK] (“Though there is a strong bipartisan movement for
sentencing reform, discomfort with allowing violent criminals to avoid prison time or to serve
much shorter sentences has left prominent conservatives reluctant to echo the call to ‘Cut50’
[percent of the prison population].”). For the abolitionist left, size is not the only criticism or
even the most important one leveled at the carceral state, but rather the focus is on its very
existence. See JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., HOW MANY AMERICANS ARE
UNNECESSARILY INCARCERATED? 7 (2016) (“[A]n estimated 39 percent (approximately
576,000 people) are incarcerated with little public safety rationale. They could be more
appropriately sentenced to an alternative to prison or a shorter prison stay, with limited impact
on public safety.”); c.f. Analysis & Vision, SURVIVED AND PUNISHED,
https://survivedandpunished.org/analysis [https://perma.cc/ZB7R-9958] (last visited Mar. 4,
2022) (identifying that “nearly 60% of people in women’s prison nationwide, and as many as
94% of some women’s prison populations, have a history of physical or sexual abuse before
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evaluate the system’s size:80 Is it the number of people confined? Is it the
number of people arrested? Or is it the amount of public money it absorbs?
Most tend to focus on the number of people under penal control, and to some
extent, the intensity of their criminalization.81 While some reforms have
reduced the number of people who are incarcerated, others have widened the
net of carceral supervision, allowing people to remain in society but requiring
them to submit to surveillance outside of prison.82
Furthermore, although the size of the American penal system has attracted
national condemnation, for reformers, it is not the system’s only vice.
Reformers have devised proposals that purport to address other concerns: its
racial disproportion,83 its predation,84 its harsh retributive edge,85 and the
lack of due process,86 to name a few. Many proposals directed at criminal
court that purport to address these criticisms are in fact agnostic about size,
or they expand the size, scope, and power of the system in new ways.87 Many
direct more resources to the institutions staffing criminal court.88 Shrinking
the system has been an elusive and inconsistently pursued goal.
For example, consider the bail reform movement: although organizers
have challenged monetary bail, pretrial supervision remains firmly
entrenched.89 In their appraisal of national bail reform efforts, the
abolitionist groups Critical Resistance and the Community Justice Exchange
observed that, instead of eliminating or shrinking the legal grounds for
pretrial supervision, new bail legislation has substituted one form of

being incarcerated” and calling for the “immediate release of survivors of domestic and sexual
violence and other forms of gender violence who are imprisoned for survival actions.”).
80. See Benjamin Levin, The Consensus Myth in Criminal Justice Reform, 117 MICH. L.
REV. 259, 302–08 (2018).
81. See id. There is also a great amount of focus on overcriminalization. Id.
82. See id.
83. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 221–63 (2012).
84. See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055,
1099 (2015) (describing how “lower criminal courts are being reconceptualized and
repurposed as revenue sources”).
85. See generally FEELEY, supra note 23; SERED, supra note 22, at 27–37; see also JOSEPH
MARGULIES & LUCY LANG, INST. FOR INNOVATION IN PROSECUTION AT JOHN JAY COLL.,
PROSECUTORS AND RESPONSES TO VIOLENCE 2 (2019).
86. See id.
87. See, e.g., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. & THE JUST. COLLABORATIVE, 21 PRINCIPLES FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY PROSECUTOR 4 (2018), https://www.fairandjustprosecution.org/staging/
wp-content/uploads/2018/12/FJP_21Principles_Interactive-w-destinations.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3W5L-TLXL] (encouraging prosecutors to make diversion their default
practice when handling cases by designing programs that “keep people in the community
instead of locked up”).
88. Critical Resistance has most clearly articulated the importance of paying attention to
objective material indicators, like the size and amount of resources, when assessing the merits
of reforms to policing and prisons. See Reformist Reforms or Abolitionist Reforms?: How to
Chip Away at the PIC, CRITICAL RESISTANCE, http://criticalresistance.org/resources/
abolitionist-tools/ [https://perma.cc/YT5W-BG2K] (last visited Mar. 4, 2022).
89. I am a consultant to the Community Justice Exchange. See CRITICAL RESISTANCE &
CMTY. JUST. EXCH., ON THE ROAD TO FREEDOM: AN ABOLITIONIST ASSESSMENT OF PRETRIAL
AND BAIL REFORMS 16–17 (2021).
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supervision with another.90 For example, the new laws replace cash bail with
electronic monitoring, social service monitoring, or even preventative
detention.91 Reforms have not only widened the net of pretrial supervision;
they have or will foreseeably increase the labor force in criminal courts—for
instance, by hiring more staff to operate pretrial services and additional
judges to adjudicate bail hearings.92 Efforts in Illinois are the exception:
legislation passed in 2020 eliminated cash bail, constrained judges’ authority
to impose pretrial detention, and facilitated opportunities for release.93
Legislatures have also contemplated rewriting their discovery and speedy
trial statutes to ensure that the defense gets adequate notice before a trial or
a plea and that cases are resolved in a timely manner.94 Ultimately, these
efforts are indifferent to scale. Such changes could lead to fewer cases in the
system: with more onerous requirements to pursue a case, prosecutors may
need to be more selective about which cases to charge. However, these rule
changes do not prohibit prosecuting offices from seeking and receiving more
funding to comply with the more demanding process. This is exactly what
occurred in New York State after the defense bar secured these legislative
wins.95

90. See id. at 17.
91. See id. at 18.
92. In New Jersey,
[t]he 2017 legislation added significant resources to the state’s pretrial services
system, including creating an entire department to oversee the new law and hiring
new Superior Court judges to implement it. In 2018, the state’s new pretrial services
department had to seek additional state funding beyond the court filing fees that had
originally been designated to cover its budget.
Id. at 17. In California, bail reform “increased funding to probation departments for increased
surveillance.” Id. at 28. In Harris County, the lawsuit settlement that brought about changes
to rules regulating pretrial detention added “funding to the PIC [prison industrial complex] to
create and oversee the new release and supervision system.” Id. at 38. In New York State,
“[b]ecause ‘release under non-monetary conditions’ is now baked into state law, counties that
previously only used ROR and bail will need to create pretrial supervision programs, and some
counties will likely rely on existing supervision programs like probation.” Id. at 46. In San
Francisco, the policy of the District Attorney’s Office “did not lead to a decrease in funding
or resources for the prosecutor’s office itself, the judiciary or courts, or pretrial services.” Id.
at 52.
93. See Sharlyn Grace, Organizers Change What’s Possible, INQUEST (Sept. 23, 2021),
https://inquest.org/organizers-change-whats-possible [https://perma.cc/4TKU-K7YY].
94. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 245.10 (McKinney 2021) (new discovery rules effective
May 3, 2020); id. § 30.30 (speedy trial rules effective January 1, 2020).
95. In New York State, for example, after these two reforms were implemented in 2019,
the District Attorneys Association of the State of New York requested additional funding from
the legislature to hire more staff to guarantee compliance with the new laws. See David
Hoovler, President, District Att’y’s Ass’n of the State of N.Y., Codes Implementation of
Pretrial Discovery Reform Before the New York State Senate Standing Committee (Sept. 9,
2019), https://www.nysenate.gov/sites/default/files/public_hearing_09_09_2019_testimony_
1_of_2_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/G8DS-F96X]; Karen Dewitt, NY’s DA’s Say They Need More
Money For Reforms, WAMC (Nov. 9, 2019, 12:00 PM), https://www.wamc.org/new-yorknews/2019-11-09/nys-das-say-they-need-more-money-for-reforms [https://perma.cc/C6CRKPZD].
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Alternatives to incarceration have been widely embraced as a solution to
the problem of mass incarceration.96 Problem-solving courts have
proliferated to ostensibly address issues like substance dependency, mental
health struggles,97 and some of the unique challenges that veterans98 and
trafficking survivors endure.99 These problem-solving courts attempt to
engage individuals in therapeutic interventions, backed by the threat of
criminal sanction.100 Professors Aya Gruber, Amy Cohen, and Kate
Mogulescu call these interventions a form of “penal welfare.”101 Social
workers, case managers and not-for-profit agencies are enlisted in the service
of providing alternatives to incarceration and in monitoring and reporting
individuals who fail to accept their services.102 Prosecutors’ offices and
courts have also hired their own social workers and case managers to
coordinate supervision and monitor compliance.103 These tend to expand
rather than shrink the labor pool of those contributing to the criminal
punishment system.104
Another common proposal for reform is enhancing funding for public
defense to hire more staff and enhance their capacity for zealous
representation.105 A recent study shows that holistic defense—specifically,
representation that focuses not only on the criminal case but also on its
collateral consequences—can reduce the future likelihood of a custodial
arrest and shave off jail time for people prosecuted in Bronx Criminal

96. See PUB. OP. STRATEGIES & THE MELMAN GRP., PUBLIC OPINION ON SENTENCING AND
CORRECTIONS POLICY IN AMERICA (2012); Protecting Communities and Building Trust by
Reforming Our Criminal Justice System, DEMOCRATS, https://democrats.org/where-we-stand/
party-platform/protecting-communities-and-building-trust-by-reforming-our-criminaljustice-system/ [https://perma.cc/7YA5-6YBL] (last visited Mar. 4, 2022).
97. See BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH L., THE ROLE OF MENTAL HEALTH COURTS
IN SYSTEM REFORM (2018).
98. See NIJ’s Multistate Evaluation of Veterans Treatment Courts, AM. UNIV.,
https://www.american.edu/spa/jpo/nij-multisite-evaluation.cfm
[https://perma.cc/DKR959RV] (last visited Mar. 4, 2022).
99. See Aya Gruber et al., Penal Welfare and the New Human Trafficking Intervention
Courts, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1333, 1337 (2016).
100. See id.
101. Id.
102. See Leah Wang & Katie Rose Quandt, Building Exits Off the Highway to Mass
Incarceration: Diversion Programs Explained, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Jul. 20, 2021),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/diversion.html [https://perma.cc/232N-M83Q].
103. For example, in 2016, the Manhattan District Attorney created the “Alternatives to
Incarceration Unit” and hired social workers who were tasked with screening defendants
seeking alternatives to incarceration. See About the Office: Bureaus and Units, DIST. ATT’Y
OF N.Y. CNTY., https://web.archive.org/web/20211220140535/https://www.manhattanda.org/
about-the-office/bureaus-and-units/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2022) (“Created by District Attorney
Vance in 2016, our Alternatives to Incarceration Unit is the first of its kind of [sic] in New
York City. Our ATIU reduces unnecessary prosecution and incarceration by identifying
community-based diversion and supervision options in appropriate cases, following up with
defendants to check on their progress in the community, and sharing data on the effectiveness
of these alternatives.”).
104. See supra notes 89–103 and accompanying text.
105. See, e.g., BRYAN FURST, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., A FAIR FIGHT: ACHIEVING
INDIGENT DEFENSE RESOURCE PARITY (2019).
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Court.106 But the study revealed that holistic representation had no impact
on conviction rates.107 So far, even in relatively well-resourced jurisdictions,
like New York City, where the study took place, individual representation is
not a countervailing force sufficient to shrink the criminal punishment
system.
When it comes to prosecutors, Pfaff, for example, advocates for reforms
that limit prosecutors’ power in plea negotiations.108 With those restraints,
defendants might be more likely to take a case to trial, potentially forcing
prosecutors to reduce their caseload. But nothing stops prosecuting offices
from hiring more staff to absorb the expanded trial docket. Other
recommendations that he offers, such as drafting enforceable guidelines that
compel prosecutors to dismiss cases109 and creating incentives that orient
prosecutors toward the most serious offenses,110 might change the kinds of
cases that prosecutors pursue. However, they do not guarantee a reduction
in the number of people affected by criminal courts. Rather, these reforms
try to equalize the playing field between the defense and the prosecution.
In a different vein, recently, candidates for state and district attorney
offices have successfully campaigned on the promise of shrinking the jail and
prison populations. State’s Attorney for Cook County, Illinois, Kim Foxx,
ran for office on the promise of lightening the touch of the criminal
punishment system.111 A few years later, her office released data showing
that it had filed fewer felony charges than her predecessor’s had.112
Philadelphia District Attorney Larry Krasner has similarly reduced the
number of people in the local jail and pursued fewer cases.113 In homicide
106. In a ten-year study of over half a million cases comparing case outcomes between two
providers—one a holistic defense provider (the Bronx Defenders) and the other a traditional
defender (the Legal Aid Society), which operate side-by-side in the same court system—the
researchers found that holistic representation did not affect or lower conviction rates, but
rather reduced the likelihood of a custodial sentence by 16 percent and expected sentence
length by 24 percent, leading to nearly 1.1 million fewer days of custodial punishment. See
James Anderson et al., The Effects of Holistic Defense on Criminal Justice Outcomes, 132
HARV. L. REV. 819, 823 (2019). As the study points out, there is a dearth of empirical research
to determine what works in indigent defense. See generally id.
107. See id. at 823. Paul Butler, Alexandra Natapoff, and others have argued that
representation has rarely proven sufficient to counteract the forces of criminalization. See
Alexandra Natapoff, Gideon Skepticism, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1049, 1057 (2013). See
generally Butler, supra note 38.
108. See PFAFF, supra note 15, at 212.
109. See id.
110. See id. at 213 (advocating, inter alia, that defendants serve time in county jails rather
than state facilities so that county-funded prosecutors see the fiscal impact of their charging
and plea bargaining decisions).
111. See Matt Daniels, The Kim Foxx Effect: How Prosecutions Have Changed in Cook
County, MARSHALL PROJECT (Oct. 24, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/
2019/10/24/the-kim-foxx-effect-how-prosecutions-have-changed-in-cook-county
[https://perma.cc/UJR7-H4MC].
112. See id.
113. See Joshua Vaughn, The Successes and Shortcomings of Larry Krasner’s Trailblazing
First Term, APPEAL (March 22, 2021), https://theappeal.org/the-successes-and-shortcomingsof-larry-krasners-trailblazing-first-term/
[https://perma.cc/J2XE-MTGA];
Michael
D’Onofrio, Krasner Fights Impending $8.7M Budget Cut to DA’s Office, PENN. CAP.-STAR
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cases, Krasner vowed not to always charge the highest grade of murder.114
Yet, his office has also asked for more funding to hire more staff.115 By
contrast, in the 2021 Manhattan District Attorney race, several candidates
promised to cut funding to their office following public pressure.116 The
victor, Alvin Bragg, promised “to reduce his staff in accordance with falling
crime rates, and to stop requesting more money for the DA’s budget every
year,” but has also suggested that he will need more money to prosecute
domestic violence offenses.117
Organizers Rachel Foran, Katy Naples-Mitchell, and Mariame Kaba have
remarked on the campaigns pushing for reform-minded prosecutors that
these campaigns make the prosecutor become indispensable to reform, thus
affording their office the ability to claim more resources.118 Pfaff’s data
suggests that it is precisely the institutional and legal power that prosecutors
enjoy that created the crisis of mass criminalization.
Many reforms, like those directed at discovery, speedy trials, and
prosecutor charging practices, are agnostic about the size of and resources
directed toward the criminal punishment system. Others, like alternatives to
incarceration and pretrial detention, replace one form of supervision with
another, focusing narrowly on the number of people confined.119 Reforms
directed at the defense and prosecution try to improve due process. Still,
others deepen the system’s dependency on violence workers to fix the
problems they created. Few address the drivers of the system’s growth: the
labor power of violence workers. While it is too soon to comprehensively
assess the merits of reforms attempted in the last decade, current efforts have
made only a modest dent thus far. The criminal punishment system is not in
significant retreat: it would take sixty-five years to cut the prison population

(June 9, 2020, 7:36 AM), https://www.penncapital-star.com/criminal-justice/krasner-fightsimpending-8-7m-budget-cut-to-das-office/ [https://perma.cc/E8XE-PYL8] (“The first-term
district attorney proposed a more than $43 million budget, up 11% over last year’s budget, to
pay for 27 new positions, including detectives, and other initiatives, like replacing the office’s
aging case management system. The hires are critical for his office and would ensure
prosecutions and the courts function properly, Krasner said.”).
114. See Samantha Melamed & Chris Palmer, When Is Killing ‘Murder’?: Philly DA Larry
Krasner Rethinks Homicide Prosecutions, PHILA. INQUIRER (Nov. 14, 2018),
https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/larry-krasner-murder-cases-philadelphia-districtattorney-20181114.html [https://perma.cc/MEC9-A834].
115. Chris Palmer, Philly DA Larry Krasner Asks City Council for 13% Funding Increase,
PHILA. INQUIRER (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/crime/philadelphiadistrict-attorney-larry-krasner-city-council-13-percent-funding-increase-mayor-kenney20180424.html [https://perma.cc/EED9-42EV].
116. See FIVE BORO DEFENDERS, MANHATTAN DA RACE 2021 (2021) (evaluating
candidates according to the harm that they pose, including whether they are willing to defund
their own offices).
117. Id. at 22; see also Taylor Blackston & Sojourner Rivers, Opinion, To Confront Sexual
Violence, We Don’t Need Better Prosecutors—We Need to Abolish Them, TRUTH OUT (June
17, 2021), https://truthout.org/articles/to-address-gender-based-violence-first-defund-theprosecutors [https://perma.cc/5UKE-NMZJ].
118. Foran, et al., supra note 67, at 518.
119. See supra notes 90–93, 96–102 and accompanying text.
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in half.120 The number of people who are incarcerated,121 under probation
supervision,122 and charged123 today still does not approximate levels in the
1980s. This is not to suggest that reaching pre-1980s numbers is desirable
but rather to illustrate that any reductions in the number of people entangled
in the criminal punishment system have been limited. The United States
remains an outlier internationally.124 Given the sluggish pace of change,
might it be time to consider a resource-explicit strategy?
120. See NAZGOL GHANDNOOSH, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, U.S. PRISON DECLINE:
INSUFFICIENT TO UNDO MASS INCARCERATION (2020) (“At the pace of decarceration since
2009, averaging 1% annually, it will take 65 years—until 2085—to cut the U.S. prison
population in half. Clearly, waiting over six decades to substantively alter a system that is out
of step with the world and is racially biased is unacceptable.”).
121. I rely on the Prison Policy Initiative’s spreadsheet compiling incarceration population
information from state prisons, local jails, and federal prisons from between 1925 and 2020.
See PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, STATE PRISONS, LOCAL JAILS AND FEDERAL PRISONS,
INCARCERATION RATES AND COUNTS, 1925–2020, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/data/
[https://perma.cc/HM9N-EXVY] (spreadsheet linked under “National data”). In 1970, the
rates of incarceration per 100,000 were eighty-five, ten, and seventy-nine for state prisons,
federal prisons, and local jails, respectively. Id. In 1979, the rates of incarceration per 100,000
were 123 and ten for state prisons and federal prisons, respectively. Id. The Prison Policy
Initiative does not have data for local jails for 1979. Id. In 2008, the rates of incarceration per
100,000 were 447, 60, and 258 for state prisons, federal prisons, and local jails, respectively.
Id. In 2016, the rates of incarceration per 100,000 were 397, 53, and 229 for state prisons,
federal prisons, and local jails, respectively. Id. In terms of absolute numbers, in 2016, the
number of people incarcerated in state and federal jails and prisons amounted to 2,187,343,
down from a peak in 2008 of 2,333,275. Id. In 1970, the number was 325,630, and in 1979,
the number was 301,470. Id. Using the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime
Reporting Program, in 2019, there were 10,085,207 arrests. See 2019 Crime in the United
States Table 29, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-theu.s/2019/crime-in-the-u.s.-2019/tables/table-29 [https://perma.cc/9K4R-H6YX] (last visited
Mar. 4, 2022). In 2016, there were 10,662,252 arrests. See 2016 Crime in the United States
Table 18, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2016/crime-inthe-u.s.-2016/tables/table-18 [https://perma.cc/8UJQ-RYNZ]. In 2008, there were 14,005,615
arrests. See 2008 Crime in the United States Table 29, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
https://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2008/data/table_29.html [https://perma.cc/GP3D-YM2F] (last
visited Mar. 4, 2022). In 1995, there were 15,119,800 arrests. See FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, 1995 CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES § IV, at 208 (1996).
122. See Peter Wagner, Probation: The Leading Type of Correctional Control,
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (2015), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/graphs/probation_and_
correctional_control.html [https://perma.cc/2UAW-2QP4].
123. To make this claim, I draw on a few data points. Since 2009, according to data
compiled by the Conference of State Court Administrators and the National Center for State
Courts, in 2018, there has been a 17 percent decrease in criminal caseloads (excluding traffic
offenses and those charged in juvenile court) across the country, averaging about 2 percent
per year. CT. STAT. PROJECT, STATE COURT CASELOAD DIGEST: 2018 DATA 6 (2020). In 2018,
there were 17 million incoming cases. Id. at 7. In 2008, there were 21.3 million. CT. STAT.
PROJECT, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2008 STATE COURT
CASELOADS 25 (2009). In 1994, there were 14 million incoming cases. See BRIAN J. OSTROM
& NEAL B. KAUDER, CT. STAT. PROJECT, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 1994:
ANNUAL REPORT 7 (1996). Pfaff cautions against using the dataset for comparisons before
1994 because of changes in data gathering. See Pfaff, supra note 64, at 1243. In 1979, there
were 10.6 million criminal cases filed in trial courts. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., STATE
COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 1979, at vi (1984).
124. Emily Widra & Tiana Herring, States of Incarceration: The Global Context 2021,
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Sept. 2021), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/global/2021.html
[https://perma.cc/4SU9-ZXVQ].
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C. Defunding Violence Work: Seattle’s Solidarity Budget
Organizers in Seattle, Washington, pioneered a resource-explicit strategy
and developed a budget proposal that demands funding cuts to the violence
workers overseeing the city’s misdemeanor prosecutions. The document,
entitled Seattle Solidarity Budget (“Solidarity Budget”), describes its effort
as a “collective call toward a city budget that centers the needs of the most
marginalized and vulnerable Seattle residents, responds with funding that is
commensurate with the crises we are facing, and prioritizes collective care
and liberation.”125
The Solidarity Budget not only demands the
decriminalization of misdemeanor offenses126 but also calls for “defunding
the misdemeanor punishment arm of the municipal court and the criminal
division of the City Attorney’s office by 50% by eliminating courtrooms and
shrinking the number of cases prosecuted.”127 The proposal aims to shape
legal practice by constraining legal institutions financially.128 The hope is
then that these budgetary constraints force prosecutors to shift how they
apply their discretion.129 Reductions in the court budget cement those
changes by limiting judicial resources to entertain misdemeanor cases.
Unlike other proposals discussed in Part II.A, Seattle aims to pair legal
changes with budgetary ones to compel permanent institutional change.130
The Seattle proposal aims to counteract the mixed results discussed above,
where one form of penal control has replaced another. In Seattle, in the name
of progressive reform, the municipal court and city attorneys prosecuting
misdemeanor offenses have embraced therapeutic alternatives to
incarceration.131 The Solidarity Budget, however, rejects this move as a false
solution.
[C]ourt [sic] and prosecutors are not social service agencies, and should not
be the gateway to housing and treatment. Just as responses to mental health
crises belong in community hands . . . courts and prosecutors should not be
funded to provide the basic support and programming people need. Right
now, the criminal legal system, of which the Municipal Court and
prosecutors are a part, excels at two things: incarcerating and achieving
convictions. If we are moving away from arresting, incarcerating, and
convicting the disproportionately poor and BIPOC communities cycling
through Municipal Court, then continued investments in these systems no
longer make sense.132

125. SEATTLE
SOLIDARITY
BUDGET,
https://www.seattlesolidaritybudget.com/
[https://perma.cc/4N95-6RWF] (last visited Mar. 4, 2022).
126. Decriminalization can take a range of forms. In Seattle, for example, organizers call
for the city attorney to exercise discretion to “eliminate all filings that currently result in
referrals to Community Court. The kinds of cases currently ending up in Community Court
are the most straightforward candidates for elimination from the criminal legal system.” 2022
SOLIDARITY BUDGET, supra note 68, at 18.
127. Id. at 2.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 17–20.
130. See generally id.
131. Id. at 2.
132. Id. at 18.
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Significantly, the Solidarity Budget recognizes the connection between
labor power and the size, scope, and power of the criminal punishment
system.133 It builds on a growing literature developed by abolitionist
organizers that distinguishes between reform efforts that preserve the
legitimacy and power of the criminal punishment system and those that create
the conditions for its abolition.134 This literature adopts a materialist
approach to assessing social change: the power of institutions lies in the
resources it commands, the legal authority it enjoys, and its overall size.135
Rachel Foran, Mariame Kaba, and Katy Naples-Mitchell offer a sober
assessment of abolitionist methods for engaging with prosecutors’ offices.
They explain: “As abolitionists, we see a future without prosecutors and
prosecution. Simply put, that is our orientation to prosecutor organizing. We
focus on structural and systemic changes that lessen the power, size, and
scope of the prosecuting office, and on running campaigns that build the size
and strength of abolitionist movements.”136 To that end, they outline a set of
principles and strategies for organizing:
“(1) base-line tactics of
base-building, mutual aid, and narrative shift; (2) strategies focused on the
prosecuting office; and (3) strategies focused on shrinking structural
power.”137 In the second category, the authors identify demands to reduce
the budgets, staff, and scope of power of prosecuting offices.138 In a
forthcoming piece, Matthew Clair and Amanda Woog echo this analysis by
arguing for criminal courts’ abolition.139 Because of its endemic deference
to law enforcement, the coercive social control it imposes, and the forms of
predation it inflicts on those who are criminalized, they argue that the courts
are beyond redemption.140 In turn, Clair and Woog endorse reforms to
defund the criminal court without going into the mechanics.141 Foran and
her coauthors underscore the manifold forms that abolitionist interventions
can take, but they avoid prescribing a particular roadmap.142 I try to take up
that challenge: in Part III, I build on these authors’ insights about the material

133. See generally id.
134. What Is the PIC?:
What Is Abolition?, CRITICAL RESISTANCE,
http://criticalresistance.org/about/not-so-common-language [https://perma.cc/9B56-9VMA]
(last visited Mar. 4, 2022) (“[Prison Industrial Complex] abolition is a political vision with the
goal of eliminating imprisonment, policing, and surveillance and creating last alternatives to
punishment and imprisonment.”).
135. See Marbre Stahly-Butts & Amna A. Akbar, Transformative Reforms of the
Movement for Black Lives 4–5 (unpublished manuscript) [https://perma.cc/6A24-H87Y].
136. Foran et al., supra note 67, at 518. These principles are distilled in a separate
document as well. See CMTY. JUST. EXCH., ABOLITIONIST PRINCIPLES &
FOR
CAMPAIGN
STRATEGIES
PROSECUTOR
ORGANIZING
(2020),
https://www.communityjusticeexchange.org/en/abolitionist-principles
[https://perma.cc/
R5WC-A23V].
137. Foran et al., supra note 67, at 520.
138. See id.
139. See generally Clair & Woog, supra note 49.
140. See generally id.
141. See generally id.
142. Foran et al., supra note 67, at 520–33.
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sources of power in criminal court to tease out a thought experiment about a
possible campaign.
III. LABOR AS A SOURCE OF (TRANSFORMATIVE) POWER
So far, I have discussed labor as a source of value and as an input. But a
materialist approach offers more than descriptive clarity; it also has
prescriptive implications. If people make their realities, they also make their
own futures, albeit not under conditions of their own choosing. For Marx,
“[t]he coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity
can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionising
practice.”143 In other words, social transformation becomes possible with
coordinated human activity that strategically intervenes in the social order.
For Marx, workplace exploitation was the defining characteristic of
European industrial capitalism in the mid-nineteenth century.144 Thus,
factory workers, by virtue of their experience of exploitation at the heart of
the social order, held the power for political economic transformation.145
Although reality fell short of Marx’s prognostications, labor economists and
historians demonstrate the decisive role that organized labor played in
Western industrial states, in mitigating class inequality, and in enhancing
democracy for the working class.146 In the United States, labor unions sought
to accomplish these goals broadly in two ways: enlisting the government to
regulate private employers and compelling the redistribution of privatized
wealth for social wages.147 They accomplished these gains by leveraging
their power to strike.148
Translating this organizing model to criminal court, however, is not
self-evident. Criminal court, like the factory, reproduces the stratification
endemic to twenty-first century neoliberalism.149 It is thus also a site for
class struggle. But, unlike the factory, it is not a workplace for everyone
involved. The oppression that defendants experience does not occur through
their employment but rather through the compulsory process. Furthermore,
defendants’ leverage to disrupt criminal court to extract concessions is
143. Marx, supra note 4, at 29.
144. See generally KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO
(Samuel Moore trans., Penguin Classics 2002) (1848).
145. See generally KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, Bourgeois and Proletarians, in THE
COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 219 (Samuel Moore trans., Penguin Classics 2002) (1848).
146. See Dierk Herzer, Unions and Income Inequality: A Panel Cointegration and
Causality Analysis for the United States, 30 ECON. DEV. Q. 267 (2016); Henry S. Farber et al.,
Unions and Inequality over the Twentieth Century: New Evidence from Survey Data, 136 Q.J.
ECON. 1325 (2021).
147. See Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2, 76–77 (2016).
148. See generally JOE BURNS, REVIVING THE STRIKE: HOW WORKING PEOPLE CAN REGAIN
POWER AND TRANSFORM AMERICA (2011).
149. See GILMORE, supra note 53, at 77; Bernadette Rabuy & Daniel Kopf, Prisons of
Poverty: Uncovering the Pre-incarceration Incomes of the Imprisoned, PRISON POL’Y
INITIATIVE
(July
9,
2015),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/income.html
[https://perma.cc/TN5D-6554]; Leah Sakala, Breaking Down Mass Incarceration in the 2010
Census: State-by-State Incarceration Rates by Race/Ethnicity, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (May
28, 2014), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/rates.html [https://perma.cc/N98B-NTHA].
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constrained. The risks they incur for disruptive collective action are years in
prison, not only lost wages.
When journalists and organizers have focused on labor power in the
criminal punishment system, police unions have attracted their attention.150
But this focus overstates the role of police unions, at least in criminal court.
There, prosecutors reign supreme.151 Furthermore, as Professor Benjamin
Levin argues, this recent wave of scrutiny directed at police unions misses
the mark.152 It tends to confuse the problem of policing with a problem with
labor protections.153 Hoping to restrict the political power of police forces
by shrinking their collective bargaining rights could inadvertently weaken
labor protections for all.154
Given these pitfalls and constraints, public defenders’ unions may offer a
convenient, receptive vehicle for change to criminal court.155 Because their
working conditions are contingent on prosecutors’ resources, public
defenders’ unions are uniquely positioned to bargain for reductions to
prosecutors’ budgets. They hold the power to strike and to bring criminal
court to a halt. Their proximity to the person accused gives them insight into
the crisis of criminal court. Prosecutors shape both their labor conditions and
the intensity of their clients’ oppression. While I provide the context and
contours for such an action, because of space constraints, I do not address all
aspects of its implementation nor the likely impediments.
This proposal draws on two trends present in the labor movement in the
last decade. First, in the past few years, publicly employed public defenders

150. See, e.g., Adam Serwer, The Authoritarian Instincts of Police Unions, ATLANTIC
(June 22, 2021, 11:43 PM), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2021/07/bust-thepolice-unions/619006/ [https://perma.cc/DZY8-DK9D]; POLICE UNION PLAYBOOK,
https://policeunionplaybook.org/ [https://perma.cc/T86T-EP7W] (last visited Mar. 4, 2022)
(“Police unions—organizations that represent police officers—are one of the most powerful
forces standing in the way of efforts to hold police accountable for violence and misconduct
and to transform the criminal justice system. . . . This site exposes their playbook.”).
151. See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text.
152. See Benjamin Levin, What’s Wrong with Police Unions?, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1333,
1337 (2020).
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, a little over 10 percent of the
workforce is unionized. See Economic News Release, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union
Members Summary (Jan. 20, 2022), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm
[https://perma.cc/U9GS-DT9K]. The union membership rate for public-sector workers is 33.9
percent, which is more than five times higher than the rate of private-sector workers, at 6.1
percent. See id. At this point, I have not been able to find data on the total number of public
defenders or the number of those who are public employees. Many public defenders are
employed by not-for-profits that receive government funding to deliver constitutionally
required representation. See, e.g., THE BRONX DEFENDERS, https://www.bronxdefenders.org/
[https://perma.cc/FVY6-FG7A] (last visited Mar. 4, 2022). A 2007 Bureau of Justice
Statistics survey of 957 public defender offices in forty-nine states and the District of
Columbia found that these agencies employed more than 15,000 full-time equivalent litigating
attorneys. See LYNN LANGTON & DONALD J. FAROLE, JR., PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES, 2007
STATISTICAL TABLES BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS (2010).
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have formed unions,156 and a few have shown an inclination to social
movement unionism, a model of labor organizing in which members of the
unions push for changes that reflect their position not only as workers but
also as members of a community.157 In particular, these unions have signaled
their alignment with movements for prison abolition, including the Black
Lives Matter movement.158 Second, in Chicago, New York City, and Los
Angeles, teachers’ unions have pioneered a model of collective bargaining
known as “Bargaining for the Common Good” (BCG). I describe the efforts
of the teachers’ union in Los Angeles and the way they have leveraged their
labor power as a means of pushing back against school privatization,
policing, and austerity. I suggest that public defenders could learn to do the
same, in order to meaningfully shrink the imprint of the carceral state. It has
been said that public defenders are not able to address the root causes of
criminalization through their representation.159 But many public defender
organizations yearn to do so.160 Budget battles—the typical site for defund
strategy—are not generally in lawyers’ wheelhouse. Lawyers may still have
a role to play, however—not as legal experts but as legal workers.
Bargaining for the common good strategy offers that outlet in a potentially
transformative way by targeting the source of criminalization. While
156. Larry Dorman, State Public Defenders Got Their Union. Now They Have a Contract,
COUNCIL 4, AM. FED’N OF STATE, CMTY. & MUN. EMPS. (Mar. 18, 2019),
https://www.council4.org/news-8/state-public-defenders-got-their-union-now-they-havecontract [https://perma.cc/PP4N-VCG4] (“Local 381 President Elisa Villa, who serves as a
Supervisory Assistant Public Defender, said ‘Our salary, benefits and working conditions
needed to be improved so we could continue to effectively represent our clients. That’s why
we unionized in the first place.’”); Alex Rose, County Files Exception to State Labor Ruling,
DEL. CNTY. DAILY TIMES (Sept. 16, 2021, 10:15 PM), https://www.delcotimes.com/
2021/09/16/county-files-exceptions-to-state-labor-ruling
[https://perma.cc/QH3W-FFB8];
Carter Walker, Lancaster County Public Defenders Show Support for Black Lives Matter
Movement, LANCASTER ONLINE (June 9, 2020), https://lancasteronline.com/news/local/
lancaster-county-public-defenders-show-support-for-black-lives-matter-movement/
article_40e70006-a9d2-11ea-b8ea-33b2c5614550.html [https://perma.cc/QG92-3742]; Why
We Formed MDU, MD. DEFENDERS’ UNION, https://www.afscmemd.org/maryland-defendersunion/learn-more-about-mdu [https://perma.cc/T88L-RVKC] (last visited Mar. 4, 2022)
(describing their decision to form in 2020).
157. See Sam Gindin, Beyond Social Movement Unionism, JACOBIN (Aug. 17, 2016),
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/08/beyond-social-movement-unionism
[https://perma.cc/CL8Y-B8DW].
158. See, e.g., Walker, supra note 156 (“About a dozen attorneys with the Lancaster County
Public Defender’s Office, including Chief Public Defender Chris Tallarico, protested in
solidarity with the movement . . . . The attorneys held signs that read ‘Black Lives Matter to
public defenders’ and chanted ‘no justice, no peace[’] . . . .”); Los Angeles County Public
Defender
Union—Local
148,
FACEBOOK
(Apr.
21,
2021),
https://www.facebook.com/LApubdefunion/posts/550287156360301
[https://perma.cc/AP7J-X9AM] (“Policing, as we know it, is racist and cannot be reformed.
We will not be satisfied until we abolish the systems that continue to terrorize communities &
kill Black people.”); Why We Formed MDU, supra note 156 (“In the summer of 2020, in the
midst of the pandemic, we came together to form the Maryland Defenders Union (MDU), a
union of attorneys, social workers, and support staff at OPD. . . . We were also disappointed
that OPD had not moved more quickly in support of the Black Lives Matter movement. OPD’s
town hall meetings had unintentionally been a wake-up call . . . .”).
159. See generally Butler, supra note 38; Natapoff, supra note 107.
160. See supra note 158.
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teachers and public defenders occupy different positions in relation to the
people they serve, there are lessons to draw from teachers’ organizing that
could strengthen public defenders’ organizing.
A. United Teachers Los Angeles and Bargaining for the Common Good
In the past decade, teachers’ unions have gone on strike with broad public
support, sometimes bargaining not just for themselves but for their entire
communities.161 Through their organizing, teachers have not only shown
how their working conditions implicate struggles that affect students,
teachers, and entire communities, but they have also used their collective
bargaining as a tool to incorporate demands that extend beyond the
workplace. Their mobilizations accomplished two feats: (1) showing that
what happens in the classroom has implications for the wider public and (2)
connecting struggles outside the school to dynamics in the classroom.162 In
reframing collective bargaining agreements as beneficial not just for workers
but for society more broadly, BCG invites the public to care about union
power. Critically, the strategy requires unions to partner closely with
community groups.163 In a publication I coauthored, Direct Action for Prison
Abolition, I described the import of the United Teachers Los Angeles
(UTLA) strike in 2019 and the way UTLA executed the BCG strategy:
[R]ecently, the Los Angeles Unified School District teachers and their
union, United Teachers Los Angeles (UTLA) led a historic strike that ended
in January 2019. Their focus was not just to get better wages, but to
improve the quality of public education for their students, parents and their
neighborhoods. As one commentator described, UTLA members “were
swimming against the tide as unions narrowed their focus and tried to stay
alive by avoiding risks. The teachers instead wanted their union to aim
higher, to build power in the workplace and the larger community.”164

161. The wave of strikes and mobilizations began with the teachers’ strike in Chicago in
2012. Direct Action for Prison Abolition, CMTY. JUST. EXCH. (2020),
https://directactionzine.communityjusticeexchange.org/actions/labor-strikes/bus-drivers/busdrivers.html [https://perma.cc/8Z6M-PKCY]. The Chicago Teachers Union pioneered the
bargaining for the common good strategy. Id. Since then, there has been a surge in walkouts,
sickouts, and wildcat strikes in Arizona, Kentucky, Oklahoma, and West Virginia, particularly
in the spring of 2018. See Josh Eidelson, Could Wildcat Teachers’ Strikes Spread to Other
States?, BLOOMBERG: QUINT (Mar. 6, 2018, 4:56 AM), https://www.bloombergquint.com/
onweb/could-west-virginia-s-wildcat-teachers-strike-spread [https://perma.cc/34EJ-35YV]
(“‘The end goal is funding for public education and our core services, and if it takes us closing
down schools to do that, then we are prepared and willing to do so,’ said Alicia Priest,
president of the Oklahoma Education Association.”); Josh Eidelson, Teacher Strikes Are
Spreading Across America with No End in Sight, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 2, 2018, 2:58 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-02/teacher-strikes-are-spreading-acrossamerica [https://perma.cc/W59Y-CEBL].
162. See Diane Reddy, Labor Bargaining and the “Common Good,” LPE PROJECT
(July 29, 2021), https://lpeproject.org/blog/labor-bargaining-and-the-common-good/
[https://perma.cc/AZ4X-UGAU].
163. See id.
164. Direct Action for Prison Abolition, supra note 161 (citing Barbara Madeloni, L.A.
Teachers Win Big and Beat Back Privatizers, LABOR NOTES (Jan. 24, 2019),
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Educators came together with parents, students, school staff, and
community organizations to develop a shared vision for what needed to
change.165 The teachers did not simply build a short-term coalition in
anticipation of a strike but rather aimed for deep alignment that could sustain
long-term mobilization.166 UTLA tried to build deep and authentic
relationships with parents and communities.167 For example, parents
themselves worked as organizers for the teacher’s union.168 Meanwhile,
many teachers in the union identified with their students’ parents over their
shared Latinx heritage and identity.169 As one teacher-member explained, “I
see myself in my students in both the literal and metaphorical sense.”170
As UTLA prepared for negotiations, they crafted their demands in
partnership with the community.171 As a result, when UTLA went on strike,
a much larger community—parents, students, neighborhood members, and
community-based organizations—mobilized to lend support to the picket
line.172 With this support, built on long-term, deep organizing, the union
leadership had the mandate to strike a hard bargain.173
The UTLA’s demands extended beyond a narrow conception of working
conditions and addressed their students’ and their students’ families’ social
conditions. Besides traditional demands such as classroom size, the teachers
extracted other concessions, including the creation of an immigrant defense
fund for their students’ families (many of whom are undocumented and at
risk for removal) and the creation of more green spaces in their
neighborhoods.174 They successfully pressured the mayor of Los Angeles to
endorse a statewide initiative to challenge a regressive cap on property taxes
enshrined in California’s constitution.175 In the past ten years, labor strikes
from teachers’ unions, UTLA included, have shown how workplace
grievances can connect to wider struggles for community reinvestment.
https://www.labornotes.org/2019/01/la-teachers-win-big-and-beat-back-privatizers
[https://perma.cc/P7GG-ZBN6]).
165. Interview by Zohra Ahmed with Samir Sonti (July 1, 2020).
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. Direct Action for Prison Abolition, supra note 161.
170. Alia Wong, The Unique Racial Dynamics of the L.A. Teachers’ Strike, ATLANTIC (Jan.
14, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2019/01/why-los-angeles-teachersare-striking/580360/ [https://perma.cc/G89Y-AENX].
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. See UNITED TCHRS. L.A., SUMMARY OF TENTATIVE AGREEMENT/UTLA AND LAUSD
(2019).
175. See Steve Gorman, After Strike, Los Angeles Teachers Aim at California Tax Reform,
REUTERS (Jan. 24, 2019, 7:32 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-educationcalifornia-taxes-idUSKCN1PJ01U [https://perma.cc/W4MH-CEAJ] (discussing Proposition
13, a 1978 ballot initiative in California that capped real estate levies and resulted in a steep
decline in public spending per pupil in California and stating that repealing Proposition 13
could generate $10 billion a year or more in new revenue and allow the state to afford to spend
nearly $2,000 a year per student statewide, which covers nearly half of the current expenditure
gap for K–12 public schools).
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It took over five years of deliberate planning to build this coalition.176
Samir Sonti worked for UNITE HERE!, one of the unions supporting UTLA
efforts.177 He explains that, as early as 2014, UTLA hired a full-time parent
organizer.178 Community members formed the coalition Reclaim Our
Schools Los Angeles to articulate their demands for educational reform.179
Among other things, these groups coauthored a shared vision to resist school
privatization, and through training and political education, they disseminated
this vision in their communities.180 As Sonti describes, “The groundswell of
popular support for the strike grew out of that organizing.”181 Other observes
remarked that, by linking classroom conditions to redistribution, the teachers
and their supporters “pave[d] the way for a broader debate in Sacramento
over taxes and education.”182 Most relevant to this Essay, UTLA demanded
an “end to the discriminatory security wanding of students, which made
students of color feel criminalized.”183 More recently, UTLA has advocated
for removing ICE from schools and for the complete elimination of the Los
Angeles School Police Department, the agency responsible for policing
public schools.184
B. Bargaining for Abolition
The UTLA strike and BCG strategy demonstrate the potential power that
public employees can wield to secure far-reaching changes to government
policy. Public defenders who are public employees could emulate this work.
They could bargain collectively and demand reductions in spending on
prosecution. Doing so would not only reduce public defenders’ caseloads
but also reduce criminalization in the communities they serve.
Conceiving public defenders as part of organized labor reveals new
sources of leverage—they hold the power to strike and, thus, threaten the
daily operation of criminal court. A BCG strategy explicitly builds that

176. Interview by Zohra Ahmed with Samir Sonti (July 1, 2020).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Samir Sonti, LA Teachers Show the Way Forward, JACOBIN (Feb. 4. 2019),
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2019/02/los-angeles-teachers-strike-labor-movement
[https://perma.cc/Q3SB-K2FF].
182. See Gorman, supra note 175.
183. Eric Blanc, “This Is a Struggle to Save Public Education”: An Interview with Arlene
Inouye, JACOBIN (Sept. 19, 2018), https://jacobinmag.com/2018/09/los-angeles-teachersstrike-education-reform/ [https://perma.cc/PE9Y-DLRK].
184. See Meagan Day, Teachers’ Unions Are Demanding Police-Free Schools, JACOBIN
(June 16, 2020), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2020/06/teachers-unions-police-schoolsmovement-protests [https://perma.cc/78HJ-4AUN]; Imagine Police-Free Schools with the
Supports Students Deserve, UTLA (June 11, 2020), https://www.utla.net/news/imaginepolice-free-schools-supports-students-deserve [https://perma.cc/WX8Q-BMY6]. University
workers in Illinois have advanced similar demands in their unions, calling their approach
“abolitionist unionism.” CHELSEA BIRCHMIER ET AL., TOWARD ABOLITIONIST UNIONISM:
RESISTING PANDEMICS, POLICE, AND ACADEMIC AUSTERITY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN 11–12 (2021).
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leverage by activating workers’ awareness of their own power and by
cultivating public support for public defenders’ workplace grievances.
Defunding prosecution and policing are demands that may bring together
those at risk for criminalization and those who are tasked with its mitigation.
Less funding for police and prosecutors likely means fewer cases for public
defenders, better working conditions, and better representation.185 Indeed,
crushing caseloads are one of the defining features of public defender
workplace experience.186 Typically, the solution is to request more funding
to hire more staff to reduce the case count and deliver zealous
representation.187 But fewer cases per lawyer would also alleviate the strains
on public defender offices.
Yet, building broad support to demand defunding will require deep
political education and the development of an abolitionist analysis of
criminal court within public defender offices. That is, public defenders will
have to agree that pursuing fewer criminal cases is a desirable outcome.
Public defenders’ unions can be formed for a range of different reasons, but
mainly to raise wages and to achieve parity with their adversaries.188 To
make demands to defund will require public defender agencies to emulate the
preparations made by UTLA. First, the union must be oriented to such
demands and see its strategic benefits. The shift to social movement
unionism was deliberate within the teachers’ unions as a way to restore their
power and legitimacy in the face of growing attacks on teachers’ unions,
which were seen as the impediment to educational reform.189 The UTLA’s
organizing strategy disrupted that portrayal, clarifying the struggle shared by
teachers, students, and parents against forces seeking to privatize public
education and cut its funding.
One advantage that the UTLA teachers enjoyed in making that shift is that
some teachers belonged to the same communities as their students,
facilitating trust and the recognition of their interrelated needs.190 Public
defenders in particular settings may be able to build authentic linkages with
the communities they serve as the “organic intellectuals.”191 Organizations
like the Black Public Defender Association, for example, could help support
Black public defenders partial to this strategy, and, in turn, build authentic
185. See LYNN LANGTON ET AL., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
PROGRAMS 2007 (2010) (finding that the largest share of cases handled by public defender
programs were misdemeanor and ordinance violations). Low-level offenses are those in which
prosecutors exercise maximal discretion.
186. See e.g., DONALD J. FAROLE, JR., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT
OF PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICE CASELOADS (2010) (finding that approximately “1 in 4
county-based public defender offices had a sufficient number of attorneys to meet caseload
standards”).
187. See FURST, supra note 105.
188. See Louisville Metro Public Defenders Vote to Unionize Due to “Untenable Working
Conditions,” WLKY (Jan. 24, 2022), https://www.wlky.com/article/louisville-metro-publicdefenders-unionize/38872913 [https://perma.cc/R7UE-2UH6].
189. See Reddy, supra note 162.
190. See Madeloni, supra note 164.
191. ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS 18 (Quintin Hoare &
Geoffrey Nowell Smith eds., 1971).
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linkages between community organizations, the defenders’ organization, and
the union.192
The next step in implementing a BCG strategy is identifying targets, the
so-called villains. Typically, the scope of collective bargaining focuses on
the employer, and the demand is wages and benefits.193 BCG expands the
scope and identifies issues that “resonate with members, partners and allies
and that impact . . . communities.”194 Those demands “address structural
issues, not just symptoms of the problem.”195 Although unions that have
successfully applied the BCG strategy have identified financial and corporate
actors as the root cause, public defenders’ unions would likely need to train
their sights on the public actors who fund, fuel, and enact the criminal
punishment system—namely, legislators, police officers, and prosecutors.
Public defenders who are public employees are often bargaining with the
same government unit that funds police and/or prosecutors. In Los Angeles,
for example, the county funds both the public defender’s office and the
prosecutor’s office.196 In their contract negotiations, the Los Angeles County
Public Defenders Union seeks money to deliver services that depend on its
adversary’s productivity and output, which is in turn contingent on the
funding that it receives from the county.197 If the Los Angeles County
prosecutor’s office decreased its caseload or lost staff, those reductions
would have a direct impact on the county public defender’s caseload. The
prosecution and defense’s working conditions are intertwined. Although
elections, public pressure, and legislation have been the most frequent tools
for shifting prosecutors’ practices, public defenders could negotiate funding
reductions to prosecutors’ offices to guarantee both a diminished caseload
for its attorneys and a weaker criminal punishment for their clients and their
communities.
Simultaneously, the union would have to build long-term relationships
with the communities it represents, incorporating those voices into their
collective bargaining strategy, and developing demands together. Typically,
community groups are not privy to the public defenders’ union’s internal
192. See BLACK PUB. DEF. ASS’N, OUR HISTORY, https://www.nlada.org/sites/default/files/
pictures/BPDA%20History%20_Final%20(1).pdf [https://perma.cc/YWT7-DPSM] (“The
creation of the Black Public Defender Association is based on the recognition that creating
and maintaining a national network of skilled Black public defenders who identify with and
come from the communities most disproportionally impacted by the criminal legal system is
necessary to fight against and end mass incarceration.”); see also Alexis Hoag, Black on Black
Representation, 96 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1493, 1532–47 (2021).
193. See Rachel Cohen, Teacher Unions Are ‘Bargaining for the Common Good,’ THE AM.
PROSPECT (June 16, 2016), https://prospect.org/education/teacher-unions-bargainingcommon-good/ [https://perma.cc/C4EU-8ZWL].
194. BARGAINING FOR THE COMMON GOOD, KEY ELEMENTS OF BARGAINING FOR THE
COMMON GOOD CAMPAIGNS, https://www.bargainingforthecommongood.org/wp-content/
uploads/2020/04/BCG-Seven-Elements.pdf [https://perma.cc/MDZ5-GPBR].
195. Id.
196. See e.g., CNTY. OF L.A., 2021–22 RECOMMENDED BUDGET (2021),
https://ceo.lacounty.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/2021-22-Recommended-BudgetBook-Volume-One-Final-Online-Version.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SBB-X686].
197. See id.
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conversations.198 The cooperation is time-bound and limited to specific
campaigns. There are no formal ties of accountability. The UTLA template
suggests a different arrangement. The union actively cultivated community
leadership.199 Furthermore, it committed to regular meetings with a separate
community coalition.200 Over the course of several years, the different
constituents hammered out a shared vision.201 When the City of Los Angeles
balked at demands, teachers went on strike, buoyed by community
support.202 The picket line became a makeshift daycare and classroom for
students.203 The UTLA example suggests that there can be significant gains
both for the union and for the community if the alliance is more than episodic,
but rooted in shared values and commitment.
CONCLUSION
To answer the call of this Colloquium, the kind of subversive lawyering I
describe imagines unionized public defenders using collective bargaining
negotiations to eliminate staff positions in prosecutors’ offices. This could
lead not only to reductions in public defenders’ caseloads but also to a
diminution in the violence meted out by criminal court. While there is not
enough space to tease out all ramifications of such a course of action, my
hope is to spark a new way of thinking about reforming criminal court that is
anchored in its material conditions.

198. I was a member of the Association of Legal Aid Attorneys (ALAA) UAW Local 2355
from 2014 to 2018 and followed its negotiations closely. ALAA is the oldest union of
attorneys and legal advocates in the United States. See About ALAA, ASS’N OF LEGAL AID
ATT’YS, https://www.alaa.org/about-alaa [https://perma.cc/E2SN-ZHQQ] (last visited Mar. 4,
2022). ALAA members are mostly private employees, except for the Federal Defenders of
New York. Chapters, ASS’N OF LEGAL AID ATT’YS, https://www.alaa.org/chapters
[https://perma.cc/ARN7-UGJJ] (last visited Mar. 4, 2022). ALAA does work in coalition with
community groups on specific legislative campaigns; it has not adopted a BCG approach.
Coalitions and Campaigns, ASS’N OF LEGAL AID ATT’YS, https://www.alaa.org/coalitionscampaigns [https://perma.cc/A8GT-JXJ2] (last visited Mar. 4, 2022).
199. See supra notes 165–73 and accompanying text.
200. See Interview by Zohra Ahmed with Samir Sonti (July 1, 2020).
201. See supra notes 165–73 and accompanying text.
202. See Interview by Zohra Ahmed with Samir Sonti (July 1, 2020).
203. See supra notes 171–73 and accompanying text.

